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THE DEPROFESSIONALIZATION OF LEGAL 
TEACHING AND SCHOLARSHIP 
Richard A. Posner* 
The editors have asked me to comment on Judge Edwards' double-
barreled blast at legal education and the practice of law .1 This I am 
happy to do. It is an important article, stating with refreshing blunt-
ness concerns that are widely felt but have never I think been so 
forcefully, so arrestingly expressed. Nevertheless I have deep dis-
agreements with it. 
Judge Edwards' thesis is easily summarized. Law schools should 
train ethical practitioners and produce scholarship that is useful to 
lawyers and judges. Law firms should practice law ethically. Neither 
is doing either any more. Especially but not only at the elite law 
schools, faculty, especially young faculty, is increasingly disdainful 
about the practice of law (including the judging of cases) and about 
the forms of legal scholarship that assist in that practice. The faculty 
is not interested in training ethical or any practitioners, or in profes-
sionally relevant scholarship. All it is interested in is theories about 
law - theories drawn from other fields such as economics and philos-
ophy. "[W]e see 'law professors' hired from graduate schools, wholly 
lacking in legal experience or training, who use the law school as a 
bully pulpit from which to pour scorn upon the legal profession."2 As 
for law firms, they increasingly are interested in making money rather 
than in maintaining high ethical standards, and they are actually abet-
ted in this unlovely endeavor by the law schools' growing indifference 
to instilling students with those standards. As for the scholarship that 
the new-fashioned law school faculty members are producing (as op-
posed to the kind of scholarship that they are not but should be pro-
ducing), it probably has little value. Law professors are unlikely to be 
able to do economics or philosophy or literary theory or whatever as 
well as people who are trained in and work full time in those disciplines. 
There is an obvious but perhaps superficial paradox to the article. 
It is not an article about legal doctrine, although as a judge and former 
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1. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Pro-
fession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992). 
2. Id. at 37. 
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law professor that is presumably the only type of article that Judge 
Edwards would consider himself competent to write, or that he be-
lieves a law review competent to publish, under the austere standards 
that he has set down for the profession. It is an article about the soci-
ology of legal education and practice. The author relies heavily on a 
traditional sociological technique, the survey, but admits that his sur-
vey did not produce "statistically reliable data."3 That is an under-
statement. The survey was confined to Judge Edwards' former law 
clerks. He does not tell us what percentage responded or to what pre-
cise questions they were asked to respond; evidently the responses 
were not anonymous, although the article does not reveal the names of 
the respondents. 
So even doctrinalists cannot resist writing the occasional nondoc-
trinal article and in so doing tumbling into the pitfall of amateurism 
that Judge Edwards rightly decries. But that is a trivial observation; 
let me move on to more serious matters. I think Judge Edwards is 
closer to the mark with respect to academic law than he is with respect 
to the practice of law. About the latter he remarks revealingly, "[t]he 
tremendous pressure to create revenues, which so many of my former 
clerks describe, is a wholly novel phenomenon. When I practiced law 
at a large firm, some twenty years ago, I felt no such pressure, nor did 
my colleagues. We enjoyed our work."4 That "tremendous pressure 
to create revenues" could equally be described as competitive pressure 
to work hard. The practice of law has become more competitive since 
Judge Edwards' time in practice.5 Naturally it is less fun. Competi-
tive markets are not much fun for sellers; the effect of competition is to 
transform producer surplus into consumer surplus. The relation of all 
this to legal ethics, however, is complex. It is necessary to distinguish 
between two types of ethical obligation. One is to the client and is 
illustrated by rules against overbilling and conflicts of interest. The 
other is to the court or the community and is illustrated by rules 
against suborning perjury and abusing pretrial discovery. There is no 
reason to suppose that competition will seriously erode the first kind of 
ethical obligation - competitive markets are not notable for dis-
serving their customers. But it may erode the second because the sec-
ond type of obligation, consisting as it does of the lawyer's ethical 
obligations to people and institutions that are not his clients, disserves 
his clients, the customers. So there is a complicated tradeoff between 
3. Id. at 42. 
4. Id. at 72. 
5. For amplification and references, see Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurispru-
dence, 69 IND. L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 1993). 
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the gains to clients from greater competition in the legal profession 
and the losses to others. Judge Edwards does not allude to this trade-
off - he does not have the consumer's perspective - and as a result 
he conveys an unduly negative impression of the current practice of 
law. 
He is on stronger ground in his criticisms of the law schools. It is 
natural that I should think this because, as he generously acknowl-
edges, I have made similar criticisms. 6 I certainly agree that he is 
right to criticize those brash youth who radiate disdain for conven-
tional, which is to say doctrinal, legal scholarship. He is also right to 
note a shift away from doctrinal legal scholarship at the leading law 
schools. 7 Of course such scholarship continues to be written, even at 
those schools - even in the form of treatises (Areeda's multivolume 
antitrust treatise,8 Farnsworth's three-volume contract treatise,9 and 
Currie's treatise on the Clean Air Act10 come immediately to mind). 
Some younger scholars at those schools have signed on as coauthors 
(notably Kaplow, on the Areeda treatise11), and many write doctrinal 
articles (such as Meltzer12 at Harvard and Brilmayer13 at N.Y.U.). 
Still, the drift away from this sort of work seems plain enough. Not 
that doctrinal scholarship as a whole is undergoing a serious decline. 
But its production has shifted toward scholars at law schools of the 
second and third tier. Is that a bad thing? Judge Edwards thinks it is 
because it is the only type of legal scholarship that he regards as useful 
or as likely to be well done by law professors, and because he thinks 
that the law professors who have turned their backs on it are unlikely 
to have much interest in instilling high standards of ethical practice of 
law in their students. Implicitly he believes that the leaders of the bar 
are likely in the future as in the past to be drawn disproportionately 
6. See especially Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE 
L.J. 1113 (1981); see also Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 
1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. RE.v. 761 (1987), which appears in somewhat different form as chapter 
14 of RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990), 
7. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Economics on Law: A 
Quantitative Study, J.L. & EcoN. (forthcoming Apr. 1993). 
8. PHILLIPE. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRusr LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCI-
PLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (1978 & Supp. 1992). 
9. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1990). 
10. DAVID P. CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION, FEDERAL LAW AND ANALYSIS (1981). 
11. AREEDA ET AL., supra note 8. 
12. See Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitu-
tional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. RE.v. 1731 (1991); Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional 
Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 
88 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 247 (1988). 
13. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Contro-
versy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. RE.v. 297 (1979). 
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from the ranks of graduates of the first-tier law schools. So the fact 
that old-fashioned legal scholarship and old-fashioned indoctrination 
in the folk.ways of the traditional profession continue and even flourish 
in many lower-tier schools is not much consolation for him. 
Judge Edwards' argument overlooks a lot. One thing it overlooks 
is that law schools have become larger and more numerous, and law 
school faculties have as a result expanded greatly, since the good old 
days when Judge Edwards was a practicing lawyer. They have also, I 
think, improved in quality across the board - and the gap between 
the quality of faculty at the different tiers oflaw schools has narrowed. 
Law, becoming a more lucrative profession, has also attracted abler 
young people to it, some fraction of whom become law professors. 
Law has also become more ramified and complex, but no area of prac-
tice is beyond the intellectual competence of the increasingly able fac-
ulties of the nonelite law schools, so that one can hardly regard the 
shift in legal doctrinal scholarship toward those faculties as a disaster 
for the profession. As for the task of instilling legal ethics in law stu-
dents at elite, or for that matter at any, law schools, I can think of few 
things more futile than attempting to teach people to be good. "We 
learn how to behave as lawyers, soldiers, merchants, or what not by 
being them. Life, not the parson, teaches conduct."14 Anyway, grad-
uates of elite law schools face on average fewer temptations to engage 
in unethical behavior than the graduates of the nonelite law schools, 
for the latter graduates will be on average under greater competitive 
pressure. No doubt there is an informational function performed by 
instruction in legal ethics; not all ethical principles are intuitive. But I 
take Judge Edwards to be concerned about the lack of inspirational 
precepts and examples in the teaching of legal ethics at the elite 
schools rather than about a failure to impart prudential warnings. 
Again there is irony in Judge Edwards' complaint. An exciting 
course in legal ethics, aimed at students at the best law schools, could 
not content itself with a careful exegesis of the American Bar Associa-
tion's code of professional ethics. It would have to bring to bear on 
law the Western philosophical and ethical tradition. It would have to 
confront the student with the ethical questions about agency and ad-
vocacy raised by Plato in Gorgias15 and answered by Aristotle in the 
Rhetoric,·16 with discussions of the role of lawyer as statesman and as 
14. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Apr. 2, 1926), in 2 HOLMES· 
POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK 
POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 178 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1941). 
15. PLATO, GoRGJAS (Terence Irwin trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1979). 
16. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Modern Library 1984). 
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friend by scholars of jurisprudence such as Charles Fried and Anthony 
Kronman; with the philosophical literature on loyalty, commitment, 
detachment, and candor; with the profound depiction of the lawyer's 
role and character in literary works by Dickens and Tolstoy; with the 
criticisms of the traditional conceptions of the lawyer's role by legal 
realists, critical legal scholars, and feminist legal scholars; and with 
the behavior of the legal profession in crisis, for example in Nazi Ger-
many. Could a purely doctrinal scholar teach such a course? 
The most interesting question raised by Judge Edwards' article is 
whether the shift in the emphasis in legal scholarship at the leading 
law schools from doctrinal to interdisciplinary scholarship, or from 
the practical to the theoretical, has resulted in a net decline in the 
social value of legal scholarship. He is convinced that it has. His evi-
dence is that he, and many of his former law clerks who responded to 
his survey, regard interdisciplinary scholarship as useless to the legal 
profession, even to its judicial branch of which Judge Edwards is a 
distinguished representative. Offered as it is without particulars, this 
verdict is extraordinary. Consider some of the developments in inter-
disciplinary legal scholarship over the past two or three decades. The 
one that I am most familiar with is law and economics, that is, the 
application of economics to law. To begin with, it is generally believed 
that law and economics has transformed antitrust law. It can, to be 
sure, be argued that all that law and economics really did, so far as its 
impact on the practice of antitrust iaw was concerned, was to provide 
conservative judges with a vocabulary and conceptual apparatus that 
enabled them to reach the results to which they were drawn on polit-
ical grounds. Even if this is all that law and economics has done for 
(or to) antitrust, or for that matter to any other field of law, it would 
be far from negligible; to enable is to do much. But there is much 
more. Law and economics has contributed significantly to the deregu-
lation movement, which has transformed the legal landscape in a 
number of fields of law, such as transportation law and communica-
tions law. It has transformed the proof of commercial damages. It 
has underwritten the movement toward awarding "hedonic" damages 
in personal injury cases, that is, damages for loss of the pleasure of 
living. It has influenced environmental regulation. It has contributed 
to the increasing judicial favor for giving commercial speech constitu-
tional protection. It has armed divorcing women to argue that a hus-
band's professional degree is a (human) capital asset to which the wife 
contributed and in which she should be recognized as having an inter-
est. It has greatly influenced the proof of injury and damages in secur-
ities cases. It has changed the way in which lost earnings are 
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computed in tort cases. It has suggested new lines of proof in employ-
ment-discrimination cases (again through the human-capital model of 
earnings), at the same time casting new doubts on the theory of com-
parable worth. It has influenced the design of the federal sentencing 
guidelines (an economist was a member of the Sentencing Commission 
that promulgated the guidelines), which have transformed the sentenc-
ing process in the federal courts. It is powering a gathering movement 
to reform the Bankruptcy Code. It is influencing the standard for pre-
liminary injunctions and for the constitutional right to a hearing. It is 
even influencing the way in which courts treat indigent litigants. 
Judge Edwards discusses none of these examples. 
Furthermore, he does not discuss the criticisms that Bayesian 
probability theorists and cognitive psychologists have made of the 
rules of evidence, jury instructions, and burdens of proof - criticisms 
of immediate practical import, made by scholars who have at least as 
much to say about these matters as judges and practicing lawyers. He 
does not discuss the impact of feminist jurisprudence on rape law, sex-
ual harassment, employment discrimination, and the legal protection 
of pornography; he does not, in fact, discuss feminist legal writing at 
all. He is silent on the growing literature, a literature informed by 
philosophy and literary theory, on the interpretation of constitutions 
and statutes, even though interpretation is the major function of the 
court on which Judge Edwards sits. The use of testimony by political 
scientists in reapportionment cases is ignored, along with (and related 
to the theory of interpretation) the burgeoning literature in public 
choice, economics, and political science concerning the legislative 
process. 
The philistinism of the highly educated is captured in the slogan, 
"What I do not know is not knowledge," which is in truth how most 
of us think. We lawyers - especially ones of Judge Edwards' and my 
generation, who were trained at a time when the 'legal process' school, 
an updating ofLangdell's notion oflaw as an autonomous quasi-scien-
tific rigorous discipline, was in the ascendancy - find it comfortable 
and natural and even inevitable to believe that law is indeed an auton-
omous discipline. We are predisposed to believe that what there is to 
know about law is therefore a monopoly of legal professionals that 
must not be broken by interlopers from other fields or, worse, the legal 
professionals who have been seduced by other fields. But the truth is 
that professional knowledge is characteristically narrow, that this is 
the characteristic deformation of professionalization. Most physi-
cians, for example, are narrowly focused on using orthodox treatment 
methods to treat a stereotyped list of crisis situations. Preventive 
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methods of an unorthodox character such as diet and exercise, or un-
orthodox treatments such as acupuncture and meditation, are slighted 
or disparaged, while whole fields of "medicine" broadly understood, 
such as securing a safe water supply or improving dental health, are 
placed outside of the boundaries of medicine altogether. As a result, 
many of the advances in human health, as well as most criticism of the 
medical profession, have come from outside the profession. It is the 
same with law. Conventional legal education puts blinders on the stu-
dents, enabling them to tread doggedly a well-trodden path of profes-
sional success, and generates forms of scholarship that accept the 
borders of the path as the boundaries of the legal universe. It is to this 
that Judge Edwards would have the law schools confine themselves. 
I am not starry-eyed about the new interdisciplinary legal scholar-
ship. Much of it is bad, in part because a form of scholarship that is so 
difficult for most law students to understand places severe strain on 
the system for publishing legal scholarship, a system dominated by 
student-edited law reviews, and impedes the gatekeeper function that /
1 
scholarly journals are supposed to perform. But when Samuel John-
son said that a writer is judged by his worst. work when he is alive, and 
by his best work when he is dead, he was not intending to compliment 
the contemporary evaluation of achievement. We should consider 
whether legal scholarship would be enriched or impoverished if such 
scholars as Bruce Ackerman, William Baxter, Robert Bork, Guido 
Calabresi, Ronald Dworkin, Frank Easterbrook, Robert Ellickson, 
Richard Epstein, William Eskridge, Daniel Fischel, Thomas Grey, 
Henry Hansmann, Morton Horwitz, Thomas Jackson, Duncan Ken-
nedy, Anthony Kronman, Catharine MacKinnon, Henry Manne, 
Frank Michelman, William Ian Miller, Martha Minow, John Noonan, 
George Priest, Matthew Spitzer, Cass Sunstein, Edward White, James 
Boyd White, and others almost too numerous to mention had either 
been deflected to other fields altogether or been apprenticed to Corbin, 
Wigmore, Williston, Prosser, or Scott. With many of those whom I 
have listed I have sharp disagreements. But I do not believe that the 
legal profession would be better without them or that they could be 
made to plow the narrow groove prescribed for legal scholars by Judge 
Edwards and his law clerks. 
Judge Edwards might reply that much of what these fine interdisci-
plinary scholars whom I have listed do makes no contribution to the 
work of a judge or other practitioner. William Ian Miller writes about 
medieval Icelandic society. Kronman writes about Aristotle and Max 
Weber, and J.B. White about Jane Austen. Michelman has taken to 
writing esoterically about normativity, and much of Kennedy's writ-
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ing seems self-parodic. Then there is a wild literature that I have 
avoided mentioning in which law professors in immensely long articles 
subject legal texts to the hermeneutic techniques of postmodernist lit-
erary theory. No judge could get anything out of that literature, and 
this unbridgeable gap is not merely a generational one. 
But where is it written that all legal scholarship shall be in the 
service of the legal profession? Perhaps the ultimate criterion of all 
scholarship is utility, but it need not be utility to a particular audience. 
I am concerned that the production of legal scholarship is artificially 
encouraged by restrictions on entry into the legal profession, particu-
larly the near-universal requirement that to be licensed as a lawyer one 
must have spent three years as a student at a law school. But if the 
requirement were abandoned, as I should very much like to see done, I 
am not sure that the balance between interdisciplinary and doctrinal 
legal scholarship would swing decisively in favor of the latter. Much 
interdisciplinary scholarship, pace Judge Edwards, serves the profes-
sion, and in all fields of scholarship professors frequently follow re-
search paths that do not interest many of their students. 
I said that I thought that the new legal scholarship should be 
judged by its best rather than by its worst examples. Judge Edwards 
might reply that the important thing is the ratio of the one to the 
other, that if most of the stuff is garbage, the price of the occasional 
pearl is too high. But there are few more elusive or problematic con-
cepts than that of "waste." Out of 6000 eggs laid by a female salmon 
and fertilized by the male, on average only two salmon are born who 
live to adulthood.17 Does this mean that 5998 eggs are "wasted"? 
Only if there is a more efficient method of perpetuating the species. 
Scholarship, like salmon breeding in the wild, is a high-risk, low-
return activity. American universities are the finest in the world, but 
much of their vast scholarly output is trivial, ephemeral, and soon for-
gotten. Nothing ages faster than legal doctrinal scholarship, but its 
short half-life can be defended on the ground that such scholarship 
renders an immediate service to the profession. We should not be sur-
prised, or lament, that so much of the new legal scholarship is of little 
value to anyone. That is the unavoidable price of a body of creative 
scholarship that has more practical relevance than Judge Edwards will 
admit, and a value as theory that his criteria for worthwhile scholar-
ship, criteria understandably but nevertheless excessively narrow, pre-
vent him from acknowledging. 
17. ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 12 (1985). These figures are for salmon breeding 
"in the wild," not for selective breeding under controlled conditions such as on a fish farm. 
